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Abstract. What would be an adequate theory of social understanding? In the last 
decade, the philosophical debate has focused on Theory Theory, Simulation Theory and 
Interaction Theory as the three possible candidates. In the following, we look carefully 
at each of these and describe its main advantages and disadvantages. Based on this 
critical analysis, we formulate the need for a new account of social understanding. We 
propose the Person Model Theory as an independent new account which has greater 
explanatory power compared to the existing theories.
1. Introduction
Humans are hyper-social beings that are highly dependent on adequate 
interaction with others. Right after birth our survival depends on social 
interaction, and this remains a key aspect of biological, economic and social 
success throughout our entire lives. Given the phylogenetic and ontogenetic 
relevance of social interaction, researchers across disciplines aim for an 
adequate theory of how humans are able to understand others. This aim 
has not yet been definitively reached, but recently the debate has received 
new input after a decade of stagnation (in the 90s) within a philosophical 
debate virtually restricted to the choice between Simulation Theory and 
Theory Theory. Now, multiple accounts are on the table. This motivates us 
to clarify the main positions, their arguments and their relations to each 
other. We proceed as follows: first, we dedicate one section apiece to each 
central (class of) positions, namely Theory Theory, Simulation Theory and 
Interaction Theory. Based on the advantages and disadvantages that these 
accounts reveal, we argue in a second step in favor of what we call Person 
Model Theory.
1 For fruitful contributions we would like to thank Atesh Koul and Julia Reh as well as 
two anonymous reviewers. The paper was supported by the DFG-Research Training 
Group (no. GRK2185) “Situated Cognition” and by the DFG-project (NE 576/14-1) “The 
structure and development of understanding actions and reasons”.
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2. Philosophical Theories of Mind-Reading
Three competing alternatives enjoy the lion’s share of discussion 
within the philosophy of ‘mind-reading’. Theory Theory introduces theory-
based inferences relying on folk-psychological rules as the central basis for 
understanding others. This view may account for a great deal of explicit 
and reflective social understanding after age 4 or 5. However, it seems to 
be inadequate to account for the intuitive understanding of others which 
develops rather early in infancy and remains active even after we have 
acquired the capacity for explicit theory-based inferences. Simulation Theory 
is especially suited to account for the early intuitive social understanding 
that takes place on the basis of simulating the mental state of other subjects. 
However, one main deficit is that the simulation process may not be possible 
in many real-life situations, including observations of persons with mental 
disorders or radically different cultural backgrounds. Moreover, it appears 
questionable whether this theory is an adequate framework to integrate the 
basic mirror neuron story on which most defenders of this account strongly 
rely. Interaction Theory argues plausibly for the importance of direct and 
smart perception in social understanding as well as for the distinguishing role 
of online interaction. However, when seen in the light of recently available 
empirical evidence, Interaction Theory overestimates the primacy of basic 
forms of direct social coordination.
2.1 Theory Theory
The core idea of “Theory Theory’ (TT) is the claim that the capacity to 
understand others is based on a folk-psychological theory that is used for 
systematic inferences. Humans employ a folk-psychological theory (i.e. an 
abstract and coherent system of law-like assumptions) to derive the mental 
states of others, such as their beliefs, attitudes, desires or emotions, and to 
thereby anticipate their future behavior.
A modular version of TT is provided by Baron-Cohen (1995), according 
to which the human psychological system is composed of various modules 
which interpret the world in accordance with an inborn organizational 
structure evolved through natural selection. Each module is tailored to solve 
a certain adaptive problem, and correspondingly there exists a specialized 
mindreading system designed to comprehend and predict the behavior 
of other subjects. Due to its linkage with perceptual processes, this system 
enables the recognition of visible cues reliably indicating the internal mental 
states of others. The flexible and fast inference of the complete range of 
mental states from observable signals depends on the management of the 
‘Theory-of-Mind-Mechanism’ (ToMM).
In contrast, Gopnik & Wellman (1992) assume that children gradually 
develop a Theory-of-Mind (ToM) ability that is based on the same cognitive 
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mechanisms that adults apply in the development of scientific theories. 
During a constant learning process, children generate general assumptions 
about unobservable entities, formulate expectations, adjust their theory in 
accordance with the evidential data they collect through experience, invent 
auxiliary hypothesis and replace their theoretical constructs and rules in 
the light of continuously occurring counter-evidences. The progressive 
improvement of this causal-explanatory theory about how others come to 
perform specific actions finally leads to a coherent representational system of 
propositional attitudes.
Accordingly, the main difference between those two accounts concerns 
the acquisition of the ability to explicitly represent the mental states of others. 
Gopnik & Wellman claim that the ToM ability is based on a psychological 
theory which passes through the same dynamic process of prediction, 
falsification and adjustment as do scientific theories, until it reaches the status 
of a mature theory which complies with the demands of a full-blown ToM 
ability. Conversely, Baron-Cohen argues for a phased maturing of distinct 
innate modules, where the ToMM comes into operation only in the final stage. 
Nevertheless, both accounts agree on the assumption that from a certain point 
in infantile development humans refer to a complex theory-like structure of 
mentalistic knowledge to infer the propositional attitudes of others.
This idea is supported by experimental studies proving that approximately 
around the age of 4 children possess the mentalistic abilities to pass the so-
called ‘false belief task’, an experimental setup which has been implemented 
in widely known versions by Wimmer & Perner (1983). According to Baron-
Cohen (1995), at this age children have mastered the use of the ToMM, while 
Gopnik & Wellman (1992) interprets the results as a further improvement 
of their causal-explanatory theory based on previous experiences of false 
prediction. Independently from the question of ontogenetic genesis, the 
employment of theory-based inferences is treated as the general epistemic 
strategy used by older children and adults in everyday life. This inferential 
mindreading mechanism proves especially useful in understanding other 
subjects which differ fundamentally in their mindset and their behavioral 
patterns from oneself. Such situations might occur in contact with members 
of other cultures, with persons suffering from mental diseases, or with animals 
(Newen 2015a). Furthermore, humans tend to use the epistemic strategy of 
TT when a social situation offers merely a small number of perceptual cues 
for the internal state of persons involved (Baron-Cohen 1995).
According to TT, theory-based inferences are the primary mentalistic 
strategy. However, TT overlooks the possibility of having direct access to many 
basic mental phenomena, simply by simulating the other’s situation or directly 
perceiving their mind state. It overintellectualizes intuitive understanding in 
early infancy and it underestimates the role of second-person involvement as 
well as the role of one’s own experiences in understanding others.
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The TT assumes the employment of a third-person viewpoint towards 
another person’s mental states in a manner analogous to scientific inquiry. 
Nevertheless, the ability to comprehend and predict behavior in mentalistic 
terms becomes particularly important in interpersonal cooperation where 
the mindreading person does not merely function as an observer but as a 
dynamic interacting part (Di Paolo & De Jaegher 2012). The worry is that 
the observational stance which is usually adequate in science is only an 
exceptional perspective in understanding others, while humans are frequently 
involved in second-person interactions (Vogeley, Schilbach & Newen 2013; 
Schilbach et al. 2013). Furthermore, instead of relying on a theory, people 
sometimes just rely on their own sparse experiences in similar situations as a 
basis for mindreading (Goldman 1992).
The method of the TT is grounded on the assumption that internal 
mental states are only accessible due to complex inferences whereas 
observational behavior constitutes the evidential basis for further theoretical 
considerations. Conversely, understanding others does not always require 
such intellectual capacities (Gallagher 2008). At least within human culture, 
we seem to possess the universal ability to directly perceive basic emotions 
(Ekman & Friesen 1971; Gallagher 2008; Newen et al. 2015). Even young 
infants are able to intuitively understand others although they have not yet 
acquired an explicit or implicit theory of systematically interconnected beliefs. 
Ontogenetic studies clearly demonstrate that infants of less than one year of 
age are sensitive in their reactions to the affective expressions of caretakers, 
as in the visual cliff experiment (Sorce et. al. 1985), and they expect a smooth 
interaction pattern which leads to irritation if not used, as in the still face 
paradigm (Weinberg et. al. 2008).
2.2 Simulation Theory
In contrast to TT, ‘Simulation Theory’ (ST) dismisses the assumption 
that humans use a specific ‘theory’ to understand other people’s minds. 
Rather, subjects simulate the others’ situations and ‘put themselves in the 
other’s shoes’. The ST account does not need to presuppose a generalized set 
of laws similar to science, and it is characterized as information-poor mind-
reading (Goldman 1992) as it does not presuppose an interconnected set 
of beliefs or belief-like information. However, as argued by Gordon (1986, 
1992), simulating other minds does not merely mean to project one’s own 
situation, as it also requires necessary adjustments concerning other persons 
and their perspectives. It is suggested that ST is routed in phylogenetically 
and ontogenetically basic mechanisms, taking advantage, for instance, 
of human abilities to read gaze direction or to imitate others (Gallese & 
Goldman 1998). Simulation enables subjects to generate explanations for the 
behavior of others and to predict how they are most likely to act in the future 
(Goldman 1989; Gordon 1992; Spaulding 2010). Some of these simulations 
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are thought of as conscious and voluntary processes (Goldman 2006), others 
as unconscious and automatic in the sense that they do not require access or 
control over the stimulation processes (Gordon 1992).
Egocentric errors or biases, i.e. the influences of the mindreader’s own 
mental states on the ascription of mental states to others, provide the first 
evidence for ST (Goldman & Jordan 2013). A paradigmatic example is 
the so-called curse of knowledge. This term designates the phenomenon 
that the participant’s own knowledge influences his attribution to another 
person, although the participant is informed about the difference between 
their own and the other person’s knowledge (Birch & Bloom 2003; Camerer, 
Loewenstein & Weber 1989; Nickerson 1999). ST also gathers support from 
neurophysiological studies where, for instance, amygdala lesions do not only 
strongly reduce the experience of fear in patients, but also their ability to 
recognize the fear of others on the basis of their facial expressions (Adolphs 
et al. 1994).
The interdependence of first-person experience and third-person 
observation receives further evidence from the discovery of mirror neurons. 
The class of mirror neurons, first discovered in monkeys, is active both during 
the performance of an action as well as during the observation of another 
individual performing this very action (Di Pellegrino et al. 1992; Rizzolatti & 
Craighero 2004). It has been proposed that when we observe someone perform 
an action, activation in our mirror neuron system simulates the action ‘as if ’ 
we were performing it. The discovery of mirror neurons is supposed to be the 
most striking evidence for ST, as they are supposed to constitute the neural 
realization of at least the automatic forms of simulation. The mirror neuron 
system has thus been proposed as the basis for our understanding of others 
(Gallese & Goldman 1998; Keysers & Gazzola 2009; Rizzolatti & Craighero 
2004; Sinigaglia & Rizzolatti 2008).
Despite the supporting evidences for ST, the theory faces several main 
issues. First, one can think of many cases in which subjects reliably predict 
the experience and behavior of others without being able to simulate 
them. For instance, ST is not necessary to understand persons with mental 
disorders, such as patients suffering from delusion of persecution, or persons 
who exhibit idiosyncratic, irrational behavior (Tversky & Kahneman 1974). 
The same also holds for beings involved in radically different cultures 
(Newen & Schlicht 2009). Their minds are simply too different from one’s 
own to apply the epistemic strategy of simulation. Nonetheless, persons who 
possess general or specific knowledge about the respective subjects are able 
to understand what is going on in their minds and to successfully interact 
with them (Newen 2015a). This general or specific information we make 
use of can be learned as rules-of-thumb or an explicit theory, e.g. how to 
deal with a schizophrenic family member, without being able to simulate this 
person. Understanding based on behavioral rules-of-thumb or a theory can 
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be quite advanced and enables smooth interaction despite lacking short-term 
or even long-term simulating or intuitive access to the deviating mindset of 
the others. To justify this relevance of rules-of-thumb or explicit theories in 
cases of mental disorders, we appeal to everyday experiences in dealing with 
persons with different mindsets (and without knowing this mindset), but we 
can also rely on studies with Asperger autistic people: they have a large deficit 
in all types of intuitive or simulative epistemic access to others but they can 
learn to partially compensate by learning to apply explicit theoretical rules. 
This indicates that simulation is not necessary and that non-autistic people 
rely on a plurality of epistemic strategies, not only simulation which can be 
lacking (for details see section 3.2 the pathology argument).
Second, ST remains limited in the sense that it adopts a first-person 
perspective in which the simulating individual is still considered as an 
observer (Gallagher 2008). Our requirements for understanding others’ 
actions, however, is critical when we are interacting with them (Schilbach 
et al. 2013) whereby this online interaction is often realized with non-
simulative but complementary actions (de Bruin et al. 2012). Third, the 
discovery of mirror neurons does not so far explain the relation between 
the first-person and third-person perspective. Mirror-neurons encode for 
certain types of actions and emotion, but they do not provide an answer to 
the question of how we attribute internal states to others on the basis of these 
neural processes. Moreover, the neural correlate in the case of third-person 
attribution of, for instance, beliefs does not involve the most characteristic 
correlates of first-person attribution of belief (Vogeley et al. 2001; Vogeley 
& Newen 2002), whereas ST would expect such an involvement. Thus, 
despite the important discovery of the mirror neuron system, its role in 
the process of understanding others still needs to be worked out in detail 
and its function in cases of simulation (which might sometimes happen) 
needs to be complemented by further neural processes. As long as this part 
of the story is missing, the mirror neuron system remains an interesting 
and still important component for automatic social processing (Neufeld et 
al. 2016), but this component still needs to be integrated into a theory of 
understanding others.
2.3 Interaction Theory
Interaction Theory (IT) is a phenomenologically inspired approach 
which claims that we understand others primarily and most importantly in 
situations of direct social interaction, which leads to the distinction between 
online and offline forms of social understanding (Frith & Frith 2003). More 
precisely, IT combines at least two claims: one about the important role of 
direct perception of mental states of others independent from any inferences 
(Gallagher 2008), and one about the primacy of understanding by adequate 
interaction (Hutto & Gallagher 2008).
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IT characterizes human ‘mindreading’ as a form of smart perception. 
This means that the content of our perceptual experience can be rich and 
include mental phenomena in the sense that we can directly perceive the 
internal states of other subjects. While some argue that the contents of 
perceptual experiences are exclusively low-level properties (Tye 1995), 
in recent years many people have argued that the contents of perceptual 
experiences can also involve high-level entities such as causal relations 
(Butterfill 2009; Siegel 2009), actions and agency (Gao et al. 2009; Rutherford 
& Kuhlmeier 2013). In the same way, a phenomenological perspective is 
often used to argue for the rich content of our perceptual experience in social 
cognition, prominently defended by Gallagher (2008) and Zahavi (2011). The 
general line of argument can be roughly characterized as follows: perceptual 
experiences can be cognitively penetrated and they can thereby involve a rich 
content (McPherson 2012; Vetter & Newen 2014; Newen & Vetter 2016). 
Expert perception, we may say, is different from the perception of laypersons. 
A chess expert has a richer perceptual content when looking at a chessboard 
compared to a novice (Newen 2017). Since humans are hyper-social beings 
and, thus, most likely experts in understanding others, we are able to have a 
rich content in our social perception, e.g. in the perception of others’ emotions 
(Zahavi 2011; Marchi & Newen 2015) or intentions (Pacherie 2005).
The relevance of direct perception has been convincingly argued for, and 
as a consequence even some representatives of TT have recently started to 
include direct perception as an important epistemic tool (Herschbach 2012; 
Carruthers 2015). Thus, direct perception appears as a certain kind of epistemic 
strategy that might be employed in different forms of mind-reading, even 
from a third-person perspective. In contrast, IT accounts rely in large parts on 
the assumption that the central constituent of understanding others is direct 
perception in online interaction which highlights the relevance of the second-
person perspective in mind-reading (Gallagher 2002, 2008). Different versions 
of IT allow for several strategies of understanding others, all of which assume 
the primacy of understanding by interaction (Hutto & Gallagher 2008). De 
Jaegher & Di Paolo (2007), for instance, claim that the constitutive feature of all 
cases of online interaction is participatory sense-making where this is explained 
in terms of coordination. According to them, the process of coordination in 
interaction is constitutive in many cases of social understanding. The main 
examples to support this claim are cases of special joint action based on mutual 
social understanding, such as ballroom dancing.
Some evidence for the relevance of social interaction for social 
understanding is drawn from developmental psychology, which distinguishes 
the capacity for primary, secondary and sometimes in addition tertiary 
intersubjectivity (Trevarthen & Hubley 1978; Trevarthen 1979). Primary 
intersubjectivity involves the ability to reciprocate in face-to-face exchange 
and starts from two months of age onwards and thereby goes beyond the very 
early pure imitation abilities. It is, for instance, demonstrated in the still- face-
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paradigm (Bertin & Striano 2006). Consequently, we have a communication 
basis that allows even infants to exchange and read common cues via bodily 
movements, gestures, facial expressions, eye direction, etc. Secondary 
intersubjectivity is typically realized when triadic intentional communication 
begins, e.g. in interactions involving joint attention which start at 
approximately 9 months. This secondary level involves the understanding of 
other people while acting together in a pragmatic context. It permits sharing 
and coordinating with another person’s attention, feelings and intentions 
toward a third object, event, or action (Trevarthen & Hubley 1978). While it 
is assumed that primary intersubjectivity is innate and allows even newborns 
to perceive other person’s mental processes, secondary intersubjectivity 
develops later in the first year of life. Tertiary intersubjectivity develops when 
children aged 4 begin to employ an ethical stance by beginning to manifest 
explicit rationale about what is right and wrong, as well as explicit attitudes 
about others’ mental states (Trevarthen 2006).
In addition, there is now more and more evidence that social cognition 
is fundamentally different when we are in interaction with others rather 
than merely observing them. This is shown by systematic investigations of 
the underlying neural processing, e.g. in a test of observing facial expressions 
which are either directed towards oneself or towards another. While self-
directed facial expressions lead to a differential increase of neural activity 
in the ventral portion of the medial prefrontal cortex and the (superficial) 
amygdala, other-directed facial expressions result in a differential recruitment 
of medial and lateral parietal cortex (Schilbach et al. 2006). In another study 
(Schilbach et al. 2010) of two persons either realizing joint attention towards 
an object or looking at different objects, it was shown that joint attention had 
a specific neural profile which closely matches with the so-called mentalizing 
network relying on the medial prefrontal cortex and posterior cingulate 
cortex. Furthermore, it was shown that producing joint attention (e.g. 
directing someone else’s gaze toward an object) activated the ventral striatum 
(i.e. reward system). This indicates that activating joint attention is pleasurable 
for healthy people. Together with other evidence, this triggered the claim that 
we should presuppose a second-person neuroscience (Schilbach et al. 2013) 
and, thus, it is convincingly argued that understanding others in a situation of 
online-understanding is systematically different from understanding others 
by observation without interaction.
The most important insight is delivered by the claims that online-
understanding is a specific form of understanding in contrast to offline-
understanding, and that direct perception plays a decisive role in social 
understanding. This is the strongest feature of IT, but it still leaves us with 
the open question whether online understanding is in fact primary to offline 
understanding, and if so in which sense – phylogenetically, ontogenetically 
or even constitutively. It remains questionable to what extent observations of 
simple coordination can be generalized to all cases of social understanding 
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and whether it is prior in comparison to the diverse other forms of social 
understanding (Andrews 2012; Newen 2015a). The evidence here is uncertain 
but evolutionary considerations may speak for the claim that both are equally 
relevant strategies of understanding. To survive as social beings, humans 
need to learn from both interaction and observation as much and as soon as 
possible. Thus, a primacy claim leaves the burden of proof on the side of IT.
Furthermore, IT overlooks the importance of the long-term social 
relationships which are habitual and re-activated in social interactions, e.g. in 
the case of understanding a familiar person. This long-term person-centred 
information can become strongly relevant in shaping an online interaction, 
much more so than any specific information about the situation in which 
one deals with this person, and it is also relevant in offline understanding, 
such as when trying to understand the familiar person while discussing 
him or her with a friend. This criticism can be condensed into one core 
difference for which IT cannot account: namely, the difference between the 
social understanding of a person’s actions in one and the same situation 
type, where in one case the person is a complete stranger and in the other 
a well-known person such as a family member or a friend. This is especially 
relevant since this difference is already implemented in early infancy, e.g. the 
phenomenon of infant shyness in which infants react shyly to adult strangers, 
which manifests during the third quarter of the first year.2 The relevance of 
prior information in the evaluation of a person’s mind-set is also reflected in 
empirical studies investigating the impact of stereotypes. Culturally anchored 
stereotypes (Macrae & Bodenhausen 2000) and stereotypes in general 
(Macrae & Quadflieg 2010) substantially shape our understanding of others 
(review: Newen 2015a, sec. 5.1–5.3).
3. Person Model Theory
3.1. Definition
The central idea of the ‘Person Model Theory’ (PMT) is twofold: On 
the one hand, we need to accept that humans use a multiplicity of epistemic 
strategies (theory-based inferences, simulation, direct perception, contextual 
or narrative embedding) to account for all cases of understanding others. 
On the other hand, we need to take into account that humans rely on prior 
information stored in form of person models and situation models. As such, 
2 Defenders of IT may reply that they can include memorized interactions to account for 
these facts. However, this would require substantial alterations of the innate proposal of 
IT in accepting memorized models of other persons. Another move would be to claim 
that the memorized information is available in the form of narratives, since those are 
an additional tool in IT. Although narratives are an important instrument to enrich 
information about others which unfolds from 2 years of age onwards (Hutto 2008; Newen 
2015), they cannot account for the relevant sensitivity in early infancy.
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the PMT according to Newen (2015a, 2017) aims to answer two mainly 
independent questions.3
The first question asks which epistemic strategy humans use to access the 
mental states of others and to gather information about them. Concerning the 
epistemic strategy, PMT defends the multiplicity view: we do not rely on one 
epistemic strategy as is suggested by most proposals in the literature (e.g. ST 
claims that simulation is the only or at least the absolute dominant strategy). 
On the contrary, human social understanding rather relies on a multiplicity 
of strategies which are for the most part implicitly activated by contextual 
cues. These strategies include at least simulation strategies, theory-based 
inferences, and direct perception, as well as understanding based on social 
interaction and narratives. A plurality of social understanding was described 
by Andrews (2012), but she did not work out the important difference 
between epistemic strategies and the relevant background information which 
allows a systematic analysis of the rich and varying phenomena of so-called 
mindreading.
The second question asks how the information we obtain to understand 
others is stored and organized. The central claim is that information about 
other humans as individuals or types of persons is stored and organized 
in person models. These models are realized on two levels, namely the 
implicit level of person schemata and the explicit level of person images. 
Person models are representational structures like objects files unifying the 
information about an entity, e.g. another individual or a group of individuals, 
in a form that is less demanding than a full-fledged theory as proposed in TT.
Concisely, a model contains a unified body of information. This 
minimal integrated package of information enables us to understand a part 
of the world, e.g. by enabling us to represent an entity, such as an object, a 
property, a process, etc. The resulting model enables a person to represent 
such an entity in our world. If the information of a model is enriched over 
time, it unfolds into an understanding of the represented entity. In the 
case of understanding others, the relevant models are especially models of 
persons. Thus, a person model of an individual constitutes a unified body 
of information about the relevant individual. A person model typically has a 
label, namely the person’s name, and it is under normal circumstances causally 
anchored in an entity which is ideally identical to the person in question. 
3 The notion of ‘epistemic strategies’ is understood in a wide sense and is here used equivalent 
to ‘cognitive strategies’, i.e. it does not imply specific high-level epistemic abilities like 
conscious deliberation and, thus, is not necessarily demanding. The answer to the question 
concerning which epistemic strategy humans use leaves still quite some room for an answer 
to the second question. One could in principle defend a simulation theory concerning 
the epistemic strategy and argue that the relevant background information for simulation 
is organized in person models or organized as a folk psychological theory, etc. Our view 
consists in the combination of the multiplicity claim concerning epistemic access and the 
organization of background information as person models.
Th eories of Understanding Others 137
(Under certain circumstances, this condition might not be fulfilled, either 
because something went wrong or because the respective person is non-
existent, such as in the case of fictional characters). It is further argued that 
philosophical theories so far have tended to ignore the fact that we usually 
understand others by relying on rich background information concerning 
them and their situation. (A possible exception within the representatives of 
IT is Gallagher (2011).) In addition to person models we also need situation 
models – as we will argue below.
The two central aspects of PMT, the multiplicity of epistemic strategies 
and the organization of relevant background information in form of models, 
are explicated and motivated in more detail below.
3.2 Main Concepts
A Multiplicity of Strategies for Understanding Others
There are two main arguments employed to defend the multiplicity view 
concerning epistemic strategies. (i) The ontogenetic argument indicates that 
the ontogenetic development of understanding others can best be explained 
by describing the development of a multiplicity of epistemic strategies such 
that no strategy is eliminated once acquired. (ii) The pathology argument 
turns on the observation that some cases of mental disorder can best be 
described by demonstrating that some epistemic strategies are lacking and, 
thus, others – which are still available – are used as substitutions, even 
though they often cannot compensate for the complete lack of the original 
strategies.
Ad (i) The ontogenetic argument: Quite early on, babies rely on online 
understanding by coordinated interaction. They develop an expectation of 
an interaction scheme as demonstrated by the still-face paradigm. Direct 
perception is very relevant starting from early infancy, as proven by face-based 
sensitivity for and recognition of emotions based on direct perception (Zahavi 
2011; Newen et al. 2015). During ontogeny, we develop further important 
strategies for understanding others, which also include strategies of offline 
understanding. It will also be indicated that we cannot observe any general 
dominance of one of these strategies, but that the activation of a specific 
strategy is dependent on the context while strategies are often activated in 
combination. At the age of 9 to 12 months children learn to understand 
others as participating in joint attention and joint action (Tomasello 
1999), where the latter is demonstrated e.g. by understanding the other as 
following a plan like jointly constructing a Lego house (at 18 months). At 
2.5 years children become sensitive to rules and norms such that they insist 
that group members follow rules. This involves an understanding of others 
as rule-followers, i.e. as members of the group governed by expectations 
concerning rule-following behaviour in relevant situations (Rakoczy et al. 
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2008). Furthermore, there is the well-studied ability to understand others 
by explicit false beliefs (age 4 onwards) which enables explicit theory-based 
inferences or explicit simulation strategies to understand others.4 This is 
correlated with early moral understanding (see above). Finally, understanding 
by explicit second-order false beliefs develops between age 7 to 9 (Wimmer & 
Perner 1983). Additional epistemic strategies can be fruitfully distinguished 
as developing later in the process of growing up.
There is consensus that these abilities come gradually, and that abilities 
acquired early remain intact and in use even when more sophisticated 
abilities are available. To illustrate: looking at the face of a person, I may 
directly perceive an expression of anger. However, when I am informed that 
she is suffering from Parkinson’s disease and therefore has severe limitations 
in controlling her facial expression, I will evaluate the same facial expression 
quite differently. Despite having a standard ‘reading’ of emotions from 
facial expressions, this new knowledge about Parkinson’s disease helps me 
to override my spontaneous perception. Although the direct perceptual 
impression is still in place, I will override it in this context and use a theory-
based inference to reach a new evaluation of the person, relying on other cues 
including the person’s linguistic utterances. This also illustrates the context-
dependence of the preference of one strategy over the other.
Ad (ii) The pathology argument: Some mental disorders essentially 
involve significant deficits in social understanding, and these cases can best 
be explained such that at least one strategy of the normal bundle of strategies 
is lacking. This can be illustrated by looking at people with Asperger’s 
syndrome who lack an intuitive understanding of others. They are unable to 
directly perceive emotions based on facial expressions and they tend to avoid 
social interactions (Vogeley 2012). Thus, intuitive understanding by primary 
interaction or direct perception is (almost) unavailable for them. Since 
they also tend to experience themselves as being different (Vogeley 2012), 
they do not use simulation as a strategy. Consequently, they can only refer 
to theory-based inferences that might prove useful to understand others in 
certain situations (Kuzmanovic et al. 2011). However, they lack an intuitive 
generalization of this knowledge. Thus, in new or slightly modified situations, 
they again feel lost since they do not even have a theory on which basis to 
apply theory-based inferences. Since we have to deal with new or modified 
situations almost every day, autistic people notice their tendency to get lost 
and many of them avoid social encounters. This special situation is explained 
by the fact that in contrast to the usual availability of multiple strategies of 
4 It is an open debate how exactly theory-of-mind abilities and understanding by narratives 
are related to each other. While Hutto (2008) claims that the latter is more primitive than 
the former, we presuppose here that understanding by narratives is based on a theory-of-
mind ability and enriches it. Thus, we do not discuss its role in addition to theory-of-
mind abilities.
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understanding, they are left mainly with theory-based inferences and need 
an explicit corpus of knowledge to apply them (since they lack intuitive 
generalization) (for further arguments concerning the multiplicity view, see 
Newen 2015a, 2015b; Fiebich & Coltheart 2015; Fiebich 2015).
In sum, social understanding usually relies on a multiplicity of epistemic 
strategies which are selected in a highly context-dependent manner (as 
demonstrated with the Parkinson case). Concerning the epistemic strategies 
of social understanding, we may indicate that social understanding is strongly 
dependent on the actual context.5
Person Models as Unified Information Structures (Person Files)
Having argued for the multiplicity view of epistemic strategies for 
social understanding, we shall focus now on the organization of the relevant 
background information in the form of so-called person models. There are 
only a few authors who have considered and developed an account discussed 
under the label ‘Model Theory’ (Newen & Schlicht 2009; Maibom 2009; 
Godfrey-Smith 2005). The early motivation of Godfrey-Smith (2005) and 
Maibom (2009) offers a general answer to the status of our folk-psychological 
knowledge, both adopting the perspective of philosophy of science. Maibom 
defends a version of the claim that folk psychological knowledge has the 
status of a model, while understanding a model as a special version of a 
theory such that she remains in the camp of TT. One important advance is 
that she argues that a model can be based on ordinary everyday knowledge 
and need not presuppose special knowledge. Godfrey-Smith agrees with the 
latter characterization but also makes important additions by suggesting a 
specific understanding of ‘model’ which is different from Maibom’s version. 
According to Godfrey-Smith, a model should not be understood in the 
tradition of a semantic view of theories. Furthermore, a model can be used 
in different ways such that we should distinguish between a model and its 
specific interpretation which he calls a ‘construal’. Newen’s6 account (2015a; 
2018) shares the denial of a semantic understanding of ‘model’ and in 
addition denies that a model needs to have the structure of a theory. We need 
a widened understanding of ‘model’ because this is necessary to enable us to 
account for the ontogeny of social understanding which is not the focus of 
either Maibom or Godfrey-Smith.
5 PMT is a full-blown theory of understanding others and is has been developed in a 
sequence of articles (Newen/Schlicht 2009; Newen 2015a; Newen 2015b; Newen 2018). 
In this article, the structural organization of background knowledge in form of person 
models and situation models as well as their interaction is in focus. 
6 The use of the third person here indicates that the second author, Coninx, although 
accepting the general line of the PMT, does not accept all facets of the person model 
theory as presented by Newen (2015).
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In line with Godfrey-Smith, Newen argues that a model can be much 
more parsimoniously and flexibly used, for instance by relying merely on 
particular parts of the model to understand certain parts of our world. The 
used model is not necessarily a theory of the world. Due to its ontogenetic 
perspective, Newen’s (2015a) view on models needs to be distinguished 
from the claim that “one person predicts another by using a theoretical 
model” (Godfrey-Smith 2005, p. 7). Social understanding involving models 
can take place at different levels (see previous section) and one basic 
type is online understanding by coordinated interaction. In these cases, the 
model is not theoretical but perhaps just a memorized interaction schema 
associated with and expected in relation to a certain person. Models can be 
rather parsimonious information units which especially cluster information 
about one person (or one situation).7 Focusing on information units 
about persons, their usage in early ontogeny can be without a theoretical 
stance: modelling a part of the world can be a different epistemic business 
than building a theory about it – and in early infancy, it clearly is – while 
models may unfold into theories during the systematic enrichment and 
restructuring of information.
Newen’s paradigm case of a structure of a model is what is described as a 
mental file (Perry 1990; Recanati 2012; Newen & Marchi 2016). We can create 
a mental file of an object with very little information about it and start to 
systematically enrich and restructure the information unified in this file until 
it deserves to be called a concept (Newen & Marchi 2016). Since combinations 
of concepts constitute beliefs and combinations of beliefs constitute theories, 
there is a cognitive route from parsimonious models of single entities in the 
world to a theory about complex parts of the world. Thus, folk-psychological 
knowledge which is quite different and variable in structure is usually given 
as a model, and may unfold into a theory.
There is for the time being only one philosophical approach which 
aims to unfold the rather general framework of relying on ‘models’ into a 
detailed account of understanding others. This is the recent work of Newen 
(Newen & Schlicht 2009; Newen & Vogeley 2011; Newen 2014, 2015a, 2018). 
The central claim here is that relevant information about other humans as 
individuals or types of persons is stored and organized in person models 
which are either implicitly available person schemata or explicitly available 
7  Our notion of ‘model’ can be negatively characterized as different from semantic models 
which have a very constrained structure as well as from complex models in philosophy 
of science which always have the status of explicitly available structures. Models 
positively characterized are systematic informational units which integrate information 
about an enitity into a file which is stored in our memory system. The whole integrated 
information of the file or a part it can be activated (together with at least one epistemic 
strategy) and remain implicit to register matching properties, to trigger expectations or 
evaluations concerning the relevant entity: this information could (but need not) also 
enter an explicit prediction or evaluation of the relevant entity.
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person images. The implicit person schema can typically be described as a 
unity of sensory-motor abilities and basic mental phenomena associated with 
one human being (or a group of humans). The schema typically functions 
without any explicit considerations and is activated when directly seeing or 
interacting with another person. In contrast to this implicit dimension, a 
person image is constituted by explicitly (i.e. typically consciously) available 
information concerning physical and mental phenomena associated with and 
unified to belong to one human being (or a group of humans). Thus, a person 
image is the unity of rather easily and explicitly available information about 
a person, including the person’s mental setting. Both person schemata and 
person images can be developed for an individual, e.g. one’s mother, brother, 
best friend etc., as well as for groups of people, e.g., anthropologists, students, 
medical doctors, lawyers, etc. Furthermore, person models are not only 
created for other people, but also for oneself.
There is recent empirical evidence from neuroscience that we actually 
construct and rely on person models (Hassabis et al. 2013, see Newen 2015a, 
section 5.3). It has been shown that there are neural correlates of imagining 
two central features of the ‘big five’ in personality psychology, i.e. ‘agreeable’ 
in contrast to anti-social personalities, and ‘introvert’ in contrast to extrovert 
personalities. Furthermore, it was shown that the combinations of personality 
types like ‘agreeable-ness’ and ‘extroversion’ are represented in a systematic 
modulation of the medial prefrontal cortex.
Situation models and their intertwinement with person models
An account of full-blown PMT must mention one further component, 
namely situation models. Humans have the ability to understand others by 
completely abstracting from the individual: e.g. it can be sufficient to predict 
the behaviour of a restaurant guest that we expect her to act according to 
the conventions of a high-class restaurant. This type of understanding is 
developed together with rule-based understanding of others at the age of 2.5 
years (see above). In new contexts, especially in new cultural contexts, we 
begin by employing an understanding of others mainly on the basis of noticing 
rule-based behaviour which we discern as being adequate in a situation. For 
instance, as a European one learns to understand other restaurant guests 
by learning the rule-based behaviour characteristic of high-class restaurant 
situations in Japan (special greetings, taking off shoes, sitting in a special way, 
etc.). Thus, we not only create person models but also situation models, and 
our understanding of others uses both types of model as input and selects 
the model most helpful for evaluating the other person’s behaviour. In the 
following, we explicate in two steps, first, why situation models are necessary 
and, second, how person models and situation models interact in the social 
evaluation process (figure adapted from Newen 2015a, p. 21).
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The relevance of situation models is based on the observation that 
situation models are sufficient to understand others, if we need not account 
for the individual person we aim to understand. If one is not interested in 
another as an individual, but merely as another agent in a situation, the 
situation itself often offers sufficient information to predict the behaviour of 
the people and to coordinate one’s own action with theirs, e.g. many shopping 
interactions are of this type. Furthermore, situation models allow us to 
predict the behaviour of all people fulfilling typical roles in the situation, e.g. 
the role of the guest, the seller or the cleaning person within a restaurant. 
Since humans frequently need to coordinate actions with many persons in 
the same situation, understanding others on the basis of situation models is a 
very important tool for life in larger groups. The distinction between person 
models and situation models is also captured in the difference between reason 
explanations which focus on consideration of an individual, on the one hand, 
and causal history explanations which highlight the relevant situation and 
how it developed, on the other hand (Malle et al. 2006, Fiebich 2015).
Thus, a full-fledged theory of understanding others needs to include 
situation models as well as basic ideas of the interdependence of personal 
models and situation models. A situation model is a pattern constituted 
by a sequence of typical activities or events in a type of situation involving 
human agents whereby the agents are only represented in an unspecific way 
comparable to variables in logic. Paradigmatically, this includes situations, 
such as entering a fast-food restaurant to arrange your lunch, entering a class 
room to participate in a university seminar, entering a bar to meet friends, 
etc. We need situation models to coordinate quickly with others according 
to social expectations in such situations, even if we do not know the persons 
involved. Of course, we need to account for the fact that situation models 
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vary intensely across cultures, e.g. how you have to behave in a restaurant is 
quite different in Japan and the United States.
Finally, we will briefly illustrate the second aspect, i.e. how person 
models and situation models interact. If we consider once more the restaurant 
situation, then a typical case could be that while waiting in the queue to order 
lunch, one starts to communicate with the person in front. This immediately 
initiates a basic person perception (Macrae & Quadflieg 2010; Newen 2015a) 
which leads to the creation of a person model, at least, in the working memory. 
Whether it is transferred into long-term memory depends on attentional 
features that rely on the estimated relevance of this interaction for future life. 
For instance, if the person in front impresses us a lot or if we discover that 
she will start working in the same company, this would lead to the creation 
of an explicit person model, i.e. a person image, which is enriched step by 
step during each encounter. If we have a minimally rich person model, it is 
cognitively economical to rely on this person model whenever interacting 
with the person. It allows for much better predictions because we can account 
not only for the general information concerning a situation type, but also for 
the more fine-grained information about this very person.
Situation models can be enriched by person models and the other way 
around: a situation model is a pattern constituted by a sequence of typical 
activities or events in a type of situation involving human agents whereby 
the agents are only represented in an unspecific way comparable to variables 
in logic. Person models can enrich these variables in a way that can be 
compared to substituting a variable by a logical constant (by fitting the 
person representations into the unspecific agent slots of the event structure). 
If one engages in a social understanding with an activation of a person 
model, it can of course be naturally enriched by integrating the person 
model into a relevant situation model (by including person representations 
into an event sequence). The richest understanding of a social situation is 
possible, if we have a detailed situation model. For instance, when we are 
at a formal birthday party, and we know each member of the party, we can 
enrich the situation model with all relevant person models. This allows us 
to deliver detailed explanations and make detailed predictions. To sum up: 
We rely on both person models and situation models. Situations models 
are more important for basic social perceptions of situation including the 
agents involved in the situation (but ignoring them as individuals), while 
person models are especially fruitful, if an understanding of the individuals 
themselves is relevant. The richest understanding demands a combination of 
both and their integration in a structurally fitting manner.
3.3 General Profile and Advantages of PMT
The person model theory (PMT) contains both, a theory about the 
epistemic strategies involved in social understanding and a theory about 
the organizational structure of relevant background information, either in 
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person models or situation models. The resulting general picture of social 
understanding is the following. Social understanding needs the activation of 
at least one epistemic strategy. Epistemic strategies can be used individually 
or in combination as they gradually occur in ontogeny. Epistemic strategies 
are activated in a particular situation by social cues. This activation can be 
based on a single social cue, e.g. biological motion, but typically, it relies 
on the perception of many social cues at once, e.g. in the case of emotion 
recognition based on facial expression, body posture, gestures. Moreover, 
in the activation of a particular epistemic strategy typically person models 
and/or situation models are involved. Social understanding does not merely 
rely on directly perceivable social cues but also on background information 
organized in models. Person models and situation models of certain entities 
also unfold ontogenetically (Newen & Marchi 2016) and are systematically 
enriched by the new information a person receives. Thus, these models are 
not rigid but dynamically developing.8 This enables flexible and reliable 
social registration, prediction and evaluation. The interaction of epistemic 
strategies, person models and situation models enables thereby a great variety 
of types of social understanding. In a simplified overview, we distinguished 
ontogenetically three main types of social understanding:
(i) online understanding of others realized as coordinated interaction or 
as participating in joint attention and joint action, typically based 
on intuitive epistemic strategies like direct perception or low-level 
simulation in combination with person model information, e.g. a 
child smoothly interacting with its mother activating an interaction 
schema or joint attention concerning an object.
(ii) understanding of others as rule-followers realized as expecting others 
to follow rules which are constitutive for members of a social group 
in a specific situation. This is based on person models for types of 
individuals which are also called person models of groups (Newen 
2015a), e.g. when we recognize a person as a member of a soccer 
club, we expect him to be a good soccer player preparing for a 
game when it is time to do so or to help preparing a club party 
when the celebration of the local championship is announced. 
These examples illustrate that person models of groups (types of 
individuals) are essentially involved and they have to be combined 
with situation models to activate specific expectations. Furthermore, 
some epistemic strategy has to be activated and this can be any 
of the available strategies. Such a flexible use of the most efficient 
epistemic strategy is also presupposed for the third type of social 
understanding:
8 This implies that the epistemic strategies are not only used to register and evaluate a 
social situation but they are at the same time a tool of adjusting the contents of person 
models and situation models.  
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(iii) understanding of others as having an individual mindset of attitudes 
realized by the attribution of beliefs, desires, hopes, fears, etc. to 
others in a certain situation. This is based on person models of 
individuals in a specific situation. Thus, persons are represented 
as having individual beliefs and desires such that e.g. they can be 
predicted not to behave according to a relevant social roles they 
have in a situation but according to their individual mindset which 
can differ from relevant social expectations.
In the scope of this article, the PMT cannot be outlined in more detail. 
However, it has been illustrated that PMT clearly differs from its competitors. 
PMT can account for the plurality and development of epistemic strategies 
employed by a person in different situations with regard to different agents and 
in different stages of ontogenetic development. In addition, the introduction 
of the person model enables the understanding of several important aspects 
which at least one of the competitors fails to account for:
1. The person model theory can convincingly account for the 
difference between understanding a complete stranger by relying on 
a situation model and understanding a well-known familiar person 
by relying on a rich and more specific person model. No other 
theory can account for the systematic understanding of individual 
idiosyncrasies and the relevance of cultural schemata of how to 
behaviour in a particular context. On the contrary, person models 
and situation models can do the job.
2. By appealing to the distinction between implicit and explicit person 
models, PMT can account for the difference between basic or 
intuitive understanding and complex or theory-based understanding 
of others which is underdeveloped in TT.
3. With the difference between a person model of oneself and 
person models of others, PMT can account for an understanding 
of others which goes beyond the own-self model as the sole 
source of understanding others, contrary to ST. PMT can account 
both for an understanding of others based on the self-model and 
an understanding of others based on the person model of other 
individuals or types of individuals which can be radically different 
from the self-model.
4. PMT differs from IT, since it addresses not only basic online 
understanding, but also offline social understanding.
5. Furthermore, with the outlined dynamics between situation models 
and person models, PMT especially offers a tool to account for 
situational and personal features as well as the cultural variation of 
their relevance. Thus, it seems correct to call PMT a new approach, 
not just a variant of an existing one.
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3.4 Challenges
PMT is a new framework to account for understanding others which 
confers several advantages compared to the alternative accounts. Nevertheless, 
it is still accompanied by open questions and challenges. This includes 
among others a more precise investigation of how the different epistemic 
strategies interact and under which conditions one strategy is preferred in 
case it conflicts with another. Moreover, there is a need to clarify further how 
person models are individuated and how they are cognitively implemented. 
While in the published work, there is a description of an fMRI study of 
Hassabis et al. (2013) that provides evidence for person models as models 
of personality types (person schemata for groups), it would be helpful to 
provide similar evidence concerning the implementation of person models of 
individuals. PMT also needs an explication of the borderline between person 
models of groups which are already general and rather general knowledge 
of folk psychological rules as described by TT. Finally, a detailed description 
of the interaction between situation models and person models is needed as 
they strongly influence each other: a person often has different dispositions 
to behave, to the point of virtually different personality traits showing up 
depending on the situation. In a job situation a person may be extremely 
harsh, while being friendly in a family context.
4. Concluding remarks
We discussed the four main theories of understanding others: ST, TT, 
IT and PMT. While the first three accounts – which have indeed been under 
discussion in the philosophical literature for quite some time – reveal critical 
gaps, PMT offers a promising attempt to close these gaps, albeit still having 
open questions that its defenders have to answer. The future of the debate 
about social cognition will tell which theory is the most fruitful framework 
and how it should be unfolded to deliver the most adequate descriptions 
and predictions. This is clearly an interdisciplinary challenge which requires 
the combination of insights at least from philosophy, psychology, psychiatry 
and neuroscience. The current state of knowledge indicates the need for a 
multidimensional and flexible understanding of human mindreading which 
involves individuals, groups, cultures and situations.
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